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1 Introduction
QE consists in an increase in the asset side of the balance sheet of a central bank aimed
at lowering interest rates (sovereign or corporate) at longer maturities than achieved with
conventional policy rates (Federal funds rates). The transmission channels of such interven-
tions are usually the signaling channel, the liquidity premium channel, the credit channel,
the fiscal channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel. More precisely, QE interventions
aim at reducing risk premia and returns on long term securities and bonds. The portfolio
rebalancing channel is then thought to boost economic activity by spreading over yields on
other assets. Indeed, changes in relative yields of purchased assets cause investors to shift
their holdings towards close substitutes searching for higher perspective of returns. This
tends to spread the shock along the yield curve through an increase in the price of long-term
assets and bonds held by financial intermediaries, which also generates a wealth effect. In
addition, purchases of long-term securities or bonds affect financial conditions by reducing
borrowing costs. Both effects are mutually reinforced to provide further stimulus to the
economy.
This paper analyzes both empirically and theoretically the portfolio rebalancing channel of
QE interventions. We build a Bayesian VAR model using US data based on an extension of
the algorithm of Rubio-Ramírez et al. (2010) developed by Binning (2013). Identification is
achieved with sign and zero restrictions and our results support the presence of a portfolio
rebalancing channel or at the very least, behavioral assumptions made about financial in-
termediaries on which the portfolio rebalancing channel is based. We then design a DSGE
model à la Gertler & Karadi (2013) (GKb) augmented with Special Purpose Entities in
the spirit of Meeks et al. (2014). In addition, we consider an additional housing market
à la Iacoviello & Neri (2008), in which Government-Sponsored Enterprises issue Mortgage
Backed Securities (MBS). Doing so provides an additional transmission mechanism of the
QE policies. What is crucial in our approach is that we introduce a variety of assets and
bonds that are close substitutes but whose prices may be altered differently by QE shocks,
thereby making room for potential portfolio reallocations.
First, we proceed to the empirical analysis of an identified QE shock on US data and find
sizable effects to the real economy. Moreover, our analysis uncovers statistically significant
negative responses of corporate spreads after a QE shock. In particular, the response of
a spread between private assets that are close substitutes (BAA and AAA rated bonds)
is significant and negative, suggesting that investors should rebalance their portfolios in
the wake of a QE shock. Our results thus point to the presence of a portfolio rebalancing
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channel in the data. Second, we build a theoretical model and calibrate it to the US pre-
crisis period in line with GKb. We then successfully compare the impulse response functions
(IRFs) of both models to comfort the qualitative and quantitative strengths of our DSGE
model. We thus consider our theoretical model as a suitable framework to identify the key
mechanisms of QE transmission. Along the way, we compute yields to maturity of different
assets and bonds to observe the effects of QE policies on the term structure of interest rates.
Our analysis of IRFs after a QE shock in an environment of financial frictions allows us
to dissociate the standard credit channel from the rebalancing channel. This is done by
reporting and comparing the IRFs of GKb to our dynamic. The work of GKb has only a
credit channel, which means that any difference between our model and theirs will be related
to the portfolio rebalancing channel. Our results show that the presence of securitization
mechanisms coupled with a strong market segmentation significantly amplify the impacts of
a QE shock to the economy via rebalancing effects. The latter also partially invert the yields
curve.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 describes
our empirical method and results. Section 4 describes the baseline DSGE model and discusses
its calibration. Simulations are proposed in Section 5. Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Literature review
There are few papers using empirical models to quantify the portfolio rebalancing channel
of QE transmission. A notable exception is Joyce et al. (2014), who examine portfolio
reallocations induced by the Bank of England’s QE policy. They provide evidence of portfolio
rebalancing but limited to corporate bonds. D’Amico et al. (2012) estimate both duration
and scarcity effects of QE programs in the US. Their results suggest sizable effects of QE1
and QE2 programs on long-term Treasury yields. Gagnon et al. (2011) estimate the overall
size of the reduction in the 10-year term premium due to QE policies. They argue that their
effects extend to the markets for treasuries, corporate bonds and swaps. Engen et al. (2015)
use survey data to estimate changes in private expectations about the policy rule and the
effects of QE programs on term premiums. They show that Large-Scale Asset Purchases
(LSAPs) helped to stabilize the economy but failed to provide further monetary stimulation
in the two years following the 2008 crisis in the US. They estimate that the full effects of QE
occurred early 2015. They also argue that the Federal Open Market Committee is now more
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likely to tackle future crises using unconventional monetary policies. Peersman (2011) finds
that an unconventional monetary policy in the Euro area has different transmission channels
compared to conventional policies. He identifies a QE shock with the monetary base, then
with an increase in the size of the central bank balance sheet, and finds that the effects of
QE shocks on output and inflation are more persistent than in the US.
Most of the debate on the effects of QE policies is concentrated on theoretical papers. Cúrdia
& Woodford (2011) build a New Keynesian model with a role for the central bank in the
determination of the equilibrium. In this specific framework, they show that QE policies
have no role to play. However, they argue that a central bank intervention with QE produces
benefits when a financial crisis hits the economy and the zero lower bound (ZLB) binds. In
the same vein, Hilberg & Hollmayr (2013) develop a DSGE model in which an interbank
sector is central. They consider a “collateral” policy rule rather than a simple Taylor rule,
and consider the potential benefits from including asset prices dynamics in the policy rule.
They show that a central bank should provide liquidity when the economy experiences a
bubble on asset prices. However, they claim that such a rule is inflationary, and therefore
should not be implemented.
Different transmission channels are considered in the literature. Cúrdia et al. (2012) estimate
a DSGE model in which the “preferred habitat” theory emerges. They find that LSAPs affect
the economy due to limits to arbitrage and market segmentation between assets/bonds of
different maturities. In addition, they argue that a commitment to a low nominal interest
rate for a period of time leads QE programs to be at least twice as effective in affecting
the economy. In his paper, Falagiarda (2013) builds a DSGE model that captures imper-
fect asset substitutability between government bonds of different maturities. His framework
exhibits a portfolio rebalancing channel of QE policies. He also finds that the efficacy of
QE policies crucially depends on the degree of substitutability among assets and exit delays.
Harrison (2012) focuses on optimal policy in a New-Keynesian model that includes imper-
fect substitutability between short and long-term bonds. He finds that LSAPs paired with
conventional monetary policy help mitigate outcomes arising from adverse shocks, especially
when the ZLB is binding.
Few contributions explore the impact of a securitization mechanism on the transmission of
crises and QE policies. Verona et al. (2013) propose a DSGE model in which bond financing
depends on a shadow banking system. They calibrate two spreads on bonds for normal and
optimistic times, and show that US boom-bust cycles are caused by (un)expected mone-
tary policy shocks. They draw a lesson for monetary policy in which monetary authorities
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should imbed asset spreads in their policy rules to avoid over-confidence and risk under-
estimation. Meeks et al. (2014) develop a DSGE model with a stylized shadow banking
sector. Brokers transform firm loans into Asset Backed Securities (ABS). They find that
the pass-through effects depend on financial markets segmentation and are crucial for the
dynamic of credit.
The role of the housing market is investigated by Iacoviello & Neri (2008) among others,
studying the sources and dynamics of fluctuations on this specific market. They estimate
a DSGE model and show that, over the business cycle, half of the volatility in the housing
market is explained by housing demand and technology shocks. In addition, they demon-
strate that the contribution of monetary shocks to this volatility has been increasing over
time and now represents around twenty per cent of the total volatility. Finally, they conclude
that housing market spillovers have been growing over time and that they are rather concen-
trated on consumption. Dai et al. (2013) provide a DSGE model with a segmented financial
intermediation and a housing market in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005). They consider an
explicit mortgage market and a corporate loan market. They push their economy into finan-
cial disruption and simulate the effects of LSAPs of MBS and corporate bonds separately.
They emphasize that the size of effects are crucially dependent on whether or not a portfolio
rebalancing channel emerges. Moreover, when credit markets are fully segmented, they show
that LSAPs have rather local effects and fail to support a global recovery.
Gertler & Karadi (2011) (GKa) design a DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face
endogenous constraints to their balance sheets. They simulate a typical financial crisis and
evaluate the effects of a central bank credit intermediation. They also find that QE policies
have larger effects when the ZLB is binding. In addition, GKb extend their baseline model
to introduce limits to arbitrage between long-term government bonds and private securities,
making LSAPs even more effective. They argue that LSAPs on bonds market are more
qualitative than quantitative easing, and conclude that the main transmission channel of
QE policies goes through reduced credit costs, i.e. the credit channel.
Despite the vast literature, none was found to clearly disentangle the credit and the portfolio
rebalancing channels of QE transmission. The following sections address this issue and
provide empirical and theoretical evidence of the rebalancing portfolio channel of QE.
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3 A Bayesian VAR model
3.1 Specification of the model
We run a BVAR analysis on US data with sign and zero restrictions for m = 1, ...,M
variables. We allow for a restricted form of the VAR and stack all equations into matrices
and vectors as:
yt = Xtγ + t (1)
where γ is a k×1 vector of regression coefficients. Xt is aM×k matrix with k =
∑M
j=1 kj that
includes on its diagonal xmt, the km-vector of the tth observation of the vector of explana-
tory variables, yt. We allow for flexible prior distributions of paramaters. Accordingly, we
work with priors that ensure independance between the VAR coefficients and the variance-
covariance matrix, i.e. the independent Normal-Wishart prior. We denote parameter priors
with underbars. Our priors have the following form:
γ ∼ N (γ, V γ) (2)
Σ−1 ∼ W (S−1, ν) (3)
On the one hand, we apply the following prior hyperparameters V γ = 10IKM , ν = M + 1
and S−1 = IM . On the other hand, after detrending, our series show substantial persistence.
Consequently, we set γ for each variable with basic flavor of Minnesota priors (see Doan
et al. (1983) and Litterman (1985)). The prior mean of the regression coefficient on its first
own lag is set to be equal to its first value of its sample partial autocorrelation function, i.e.
0.89 for the real GDP per capita, 0.53 for the CPI growth rate, 0.80 and 0.78 respectively
for each of the corporate spreads and 0.82 for the “government” spread.
3.2 Data and Identification of a QE shock
Our dataset is taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website1. It features
five US variables with quarterly observations starting from the first quarter of 1962 and
ending the last quarter of 2007. Notice that post-crisis data is excluded from our analysis
to be consistent with the mean calibration of our theoretical model presented in the next
section. Our BVAR analysis includes data for real activity via the log of the real gross do-
1https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
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mestic product per capita (RGDP) and the log-difference of the consumer price index (CPI).
We consider two corporate spreads: the spread between BAA and AAA Moody’s seasoned
corporate bond yields (BAA-AAA) and the spread between Moody’s Seasoned BAA corpo-
rate bond yield and the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate (BAA-10Y). We complete
the dataset with a “government” spread between the 10-year Treasury constant maturity
rate and the effective Federal Funds rate (10Y-FFR). All time series are detrended using
a one-sided HP filter with a smoothing parameter λ = 16002. Our choice of variables has
been made to be consistent with our theoretical model, which will allow for a straightfor-
ward comparison of our empirical and theoretical IRFs. Details about the identification of
the QE shock will be given in the next paragraph but we argue that a negative response
of the BAA-AAA spread to such a shock would be considered a clear empirical evidence of
the portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. Conversely, a muted or statistically non-significant
response would indicate that this channel is absent.
Identification is achieved using an extension of the algorithm developed by Rubio-Ramírez
et al. (2010) that solves for short and long-run restrictions. However, as mentioned in
Canova (2007), DSGE models do not offer consistent short-run zero restrictions as in a
Cholesky decomposition identification scheme in which strong assumptions on the location
and the number of zero restrictions are imposed. To overcome these problems, we use a
method suggested by Binning (2013), that allows for short and long-run restrictions along
with sign-restrictions.3 This tractable method allows to identify the single shock we are
interested in, while preserving computational tractability. Table 1 summarizes the sign and
zero restrictions imposed in the benchmark model. The sign restrictions are inspired by the
theoretical model detailed in the next section.
A structural QE shock is assumed to produce a negative one standard deviation fall in the
spread between the 10-year Treasury rate and the Federal Funds rate. In addition, the shock
should raise real GDP for at least 4 quarters while its long-run effects must be null on this
latter. Further, we wish for the shock to lower both corporate spreads for at least 4 quarters.
The sign of the response of the inflation rate is left unrestricted. Our estimation uses a
two-lags specification of the BVAR process, and includes a constant term. We compute 50
000 draws of the posterior distribution of the BVAR coefficients and IRFs and drop the first
10 000 as burn-in. Our results are detailed in the next paragraph.
2The Matlab code was implemented by Meyer-Gohde (2010).
3Computer codes of the conditional posterior distribution of the coefficients and the Gibbs sampling
algorithm are available upon request. See Binning (2013) for a complete and detailed description of the
algorithm.
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Table 1: Identification scheme, Zero and Sign Restrictions
QE shock
Variables Zero Sign Horizons
LR
Real Gross Domestic Product per capita 0 > 0 4
Consumer Index Production - - -
BAA - AAA - < 0 4
BAA - 10Y spread - < 0 4
10Y Treasury Constant Maturity Rate - Federal Funds rate - - 4
3.3 Results and comments
Figure 1 presents the dynamics of the simulations. We report 16%-84% confidence intervals
and median IRFs. On impact, the rise in real GDP is hump-shaped and slightly persistent
following the imposed restrictions. Its magnitude reaches around two times the deviation
in the “government” spread, showing the sizable effects of QE shocks on the real economy.
The inflation rate co-moves with GDP for some periods. Hence, an accommodating QE
shock generates little inflation. Our key variables of interest, i.e. corporate spreads, show
statistically significant responses that are consistent with our set of restrictions. The BAA-
10Y index of performance of corporate bonds in market can be viewed as a proxy of credit
costs to firms or the external finance premium. Given this assumption, its drop confirms that
the economy is impacted via the credit channel of QE transmission. Moreover, the fall in
the BAA-AAA spread suggests that another transmission mechanism is at work. Intuitively,
if we consider only the credit channel of QE policies, all else being equal, a QE shock would
ultimately put a similar pressure on yields, shifting the yield curve but preserving its shape.
In this scenario, the BAA-AAA spread would show a non-significant or zero response to
the shock which is actually not the case. We then claim that the decrease in BAA-AAA
spread provides empirical evidence of the portfolio rebalancing channel of QE transmission.
Thus, a purchase of long-term government bonds not only affects its yields but also those
of assets that are close substitutes with different intensities. In other words, this suggests
that investors lower the share of government bonds in their portfolios and raise the share of
high-quality and relatively safe corporate bonds.
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Figure 1: BVAR impulse response functions
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Blue dotted line: median of the impulse response functions.
4 Model
We now want to confront the empirical IRFs uncovered in the previous section to the predic-
tions of a calibrated DSGE model with financial fricitions. The model is based on GKb, who
propose a clear, simple, yet relatively general macroeconomic model that captures multiple
features of the recent financial crisis and show how LSAPs channel to the real economy.
Our main objective is to dissociate the credit channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel
of QE transmission. To do so, we introduce securitization mechanisms. First, we model
Special Purpose Entities (SPE), that transform a pool of loans into ABS along the lines of
Meeks et al. (2014). In addition, we introduce Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE)
that transform housing mortgages into MBS. The housing sector is modelled after Iacoviello
& Neri (2008). These different assets and frictions will allow us to differentiate the effects of
QE policies on different spreads, and help distinguish the portfolio rebalancing channel from
the standard credit channel.
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4.1 Commercial banks
Commercial banks (c) collect households deposits and grant loans to firms and mortgages
to households. In addition to these lending activities, commercial banks hold a stock of
long-term government bonds. We consider a continuum of identical commercial banks and
define the typical balance sheet of a commercial bank as:
Qts
c
t + q
h
t h
c
t + q
mbs
t m
mbs,c
t + q
abs
t a
abs,c
t + q
b
tb
c
t = dt + n
c
t (4)
The asset side features corporate securities sct , housing mortgages hct , quantities of MBS
mmbs,ct and ABS a
abs,c
t and long-term government bonds bct . The market prices of these assets
are Qt, qht , qmbst , qabst and qbt respectively . The liability side is made of households’ short-term
deposits dt and of commercial banks net worth nct . Its evolution is given by:
nct = RstQt−1s
c
t−1 +Rhtq
h
t−1h
c
t−1 +Rmtq
mbs
t−1m
mbs,c
t−1 +Ratq
abs
t−1a
abs,c
t−1 +Rbtq
b
t−1b
c
t−1 −Rtdt−1
= (Rst −Rt)Qt−1sct−1 + (Rht −Rt)qht−1hct−1 + (Rmt −Rt)qmbst−1mmbs,ct−1 + (Rat −Rt)qabst−1aabs,ct−1
+ (Rbt −Rt)qbt−1bct−1 +Rtnct−1 (5)
where Rst is the stochastic return on corporate securities, Rht on housing mortgages, Rmt
on MBS, Rat on ABS and Rbt on long-term bonds. Long-term bonds are perpetuities that
yield a one-dollar coupon payment per period, such that:
Rbt+1 =
1
Pt
+ qbt+1
qbt
(6)
Bankers maximize the discounted stream of dividends paid to households at the stochastic
discount factor Λt,t+i subject to a survival probability σ. The problem is denoted as:
V ct = maxEt
∞∑
i=1
(1− σ)σi−1Λt,t+i(nct+i) (7)
Equation (5) shows that bankers can make infinite profits due to arbitrage opportunities. As
in GKb, we limit this possibility by introducing a moral hazard problem by which a banker
can divert a fraction θc of its total assets. As in Meeks et al. (2014), we introduce a weight
Θ < 1 according to which a commercial banker is more likely to divert corporate securities
than ABS. Parameter ∆ < 1 is also introduced so that a commercial banker can divert a
lower fraction of government bonds. On the contrary, we assume that a commercial banker
has the opportunity to divert a greater portion of MBS and housing mortgages through the
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introduction of the weights Ξ > 1 and Φ > 1. Following GKb, we claim and verify that V ct is
linear in the marginal values of assets (µcst,µcht,µcmt,µcat,µcbt) and in equity capital, ηct . Overall,
households are willing to deposit if the following constraint holds:
V ct = µ
c
stQts
c
t + µ
c
htq
h
t h
c
t + µ
c
mtq
mbs
t m
mbs,c
t + µ
c
atq
abs
t a
abs,c
t + µ
c
btq
b
tb
c
t + η
c
tn
c
t
≥ θc
(
Qts
c
t + Φq
h
t h
c
t + Ξq
mbs
t m
mbs,c
t + Θq
abs
t a
abs,c
t + ∆qtb
c
t
)
(8)
The incentive constraint always binds in equilibrium. Accordingly, the optimization problem
yields the following first order conditions respectively for sct , hct ,mct , act , bct , λct :
µcst =
λct
1 + λct
θc (9)
µcht =
λct
1 + λct
θcΦ (10)
µcmt =
λct
1 + λct
θcΞ (11)
µcat =
λct
1 + λct
θcΘ (12)
µcbt =
λct
1 + λct
θc∆ (13)
(µcst − θc)Qtsct + (µcht − θcΦ)qht hct + (µcmt − θcΞ)qmbst mmbs,ct + (µcat − θcΘ)qabst aabs,ct
+(µcbt − θc∆)qbtbct + ηctnct = 0 (14)
Rearranging Equation (14) gives:
Qts
c
t + Φq
h
t h
c
t + Ξq
mbs
t m
mbs,c
t + Θq
abs
t a
abs,c
t + ∆q
b
tb
c
t = φ
c
t n
c
t (15)
where,
φct =
ηct
θc − µcst
(16)
as well as,
φct =
Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1Rt+1
θc − Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1)
(17)
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in which φct is the leverage ratio of corporate securities over net worth. After few rearrange-
ments, the Bellman Equation (7) gives the optimal conditions for each marginal value:
µcst = Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1) (18)
µcht = Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rht+1 −Rt+1) (19)
µcmt = Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rmt+1 −Rt+1) (20)
µcat = Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rat+1 −Rt+1) (21)
µcbt = Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rbt+1 −Rt+1) (22)
ηct = Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1Rt+1 (23)
where,
Ωct = (1− σ) + σ
∂V ct
∂nct
(24)
and,
∂V ct
∂nct
= µcstφ
c
t + η
c
t (25)
The problem is isomorphic to all commercial banks. Hence, summing across portfolio re-
strictions and individual demands on each commercial bank, we obtain:
QtS
c
t + Φq
h
tH
c
t + Ξq
mbs
t M
mbs,c
t + Θq
abs
t A
abs,c
t + ∆q
b
tB
c
t = φ
c
t N
c
t (26)
After few rearrangements, we find the demand for MBS:
qmbst M
mbs,c
t =
(1− Φ)qhtHct + (1−Θ)qabst Aabs,ct + (1−∆)qbtBct + (φct − 1)N ct −Dt
Ξ− 1 (27)
Similarly, the demand for ABS writes:
qabst A
abs,c
t =
(1− Φ)qhtHct + (1− Ξ)qmbst Mmbs,ct + (1−∆)qbtBct + (φct − 1)N ct −Dt
Θ− 1 (28)
In this framework, when the constraint is binding, a central bank asset purchase is efficient
by reducing excessive financial spreads. Given the constrained amount of banks equity
capital, QE shocks directly distort the relative prices of assets. It is then intuitive that the
efficacy of QE policies emerges from the presence of frictions to arbitrage among assets. On
the contrary, in a frictionless environment, demands for assets would increase one by one
with the assets holdings of the central bank. In addition, we obtain the following arbitrage
identities with equations from (18) to (23) which underlines the role of frictions in the overall
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dynamic of financial markets:
Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rht+1 −Rt+1) = ΦEt Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1) (29)
Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rmt+1 −Rt+1) = ΞEt Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1) (30)
Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rat+1 −Rt+1) = ΘEt Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1) (31)
Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rbt+1 −Rt+1) = ∆Et Λt,t+1 Ωct+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1) (32)
Given that, the extent of financial frictions matters for the efficacy of the central bank
unconventional programs. Assuming this framework, the financial spreads on government
bonds and ABS are fractions ∆, Θ < 1 of the spread on corporate securities. Moreover,
the financial spreads on mortgage loans and MBS are weighted by Φ, Ξ > 1. Accordingly,
everything else being equal, government bonds and ABS yields will decrease less than the
yield on coporate securities following a QE targeted on this latter. On the contrary, the yields
on mortgage loans and MBS will be highly impaired on impact. Overall, the emergence of
differences among relative prices of assets is the linchpin of the portfolio rebalancing channel
of QE policies.
4.2 Special Purpose Entities
A Special Purpose Entity (SPE) is in charge of the securitization of ABS. Identical loan
brokers populate the SPE. We define a single balance sheet as:
Qts
a
t = n
a
t + q
abs
t a
abs,a
t (33)
The asset side features a pool of loans sat . The liability side is composed of ABS a
abs,a
t and
net worth nat , evolving according to:
nat = RstQt−1s
a
t−1 −Ratqabst−1aabs,at−1
= (Rst −Rat)Qt−1sat−1 +Ratnat−1 (34)
As in the case of commercial bankers, loan brokers face the same survival probability σ,
and maximize the discounted stream of dividends they pay to households at the stochastic
discount factor Λt,t+i. The problem is written as:
V at = maxEt
∞∑
i=1
(1− σ)σi−1Λt,t+i(nat+i) (35)
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Again, Equation (34) shows that mortgage brokers can make infinite profits from the securi-
tization of corporate securities. We limit this opportunity by allowing loan brokers to divert
a fraction θa of their assets. We claim and verify that the value function is linear in the
marginal values of its arguments (µast, νaat) in which µast = νast/Qt−νaat/qabst is the excess value
of pool of loans over ABS. Overall, the securitization mechanism is effective if the following
constraint holds:
V at = µ
a
stQts
a
t +
νaat
qabst
nat ≥ θaQtsat (36)
The incentive constraint always binds in equilibrium. The optimization problem produces
the following first order conditions for sat and λat :
µast =
λat
1 + λat
θa (37)
(µast − θa)Qtsat +
νaat
qabst
nat = 0 (38)
We rearrange Equation (38) to find the demand for pool of loans:
Qts
a
t = φ
a
t n
a
t (39)
where,
φat =
νaat/q
abs
t
θa − µast
(40)
as well as,
φat =
Et Λt,t+1 Ωat+1Rat+1
θa − Et Λt,t+1 Ωat+1 (Rst+1 −Rat+1)
(41)
in which φat is the endogenous leverage ratio of pool of loans over net worth. After rearrange-
ments, the Bellman Equation (35) yields the following optimal conditions for each marginal
value:
µast = Et Λt,t+1 Ωat+1 (Rst+1 −Rat+1) (42)
νaat
qabst
= Et Λt,t+1 Ωat+1Rat+1 (43)
where,
Ωat = (1− σ) + σ
∂V at
∂nat
(44)
and,
∂V at
∂nat
= µastφ
a
t +
νaat
qabst
(45)
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The problem is isomorphic to all SPEs. Hence, summing across portfolio restrictions and
individual demands on each SPE to obtain:
QtS
a
t = φ
a
t N
a
t (46)
After few rearrangements we find the issuance identity of ABS:
qabst A
abs,a
t =
(
φat − 1
φat
)
QtS
a
t (47)
4.3 Government-Sponsored Enterprises
A Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) is in charge of the securitization of MBS. There
is a continuum of identical GSE and mortgage brokers populate GSEs. We define a single
balance sheet as:
qht h
h
t = n
h
t + q
mbs
t m
mbs,h
t (48)
The asset side features a pool of mortgage loans hht . The liability side is composed of MBS
mmbs,ht and net worth nht , that evolves according to:
nht = Rhtq
h
t−1h
h
t−1 −Rmtqmbst−1mmbs,ht−1
= (Rht −Rmt)qht−1hht−1 +Rmtnht−1 (49)
where the stochastic return on MBS is Rmt. MBS are perpetuities that yields a Ξm coupon
payment per period, such as:
Rmt+1 =
Ξm + q
mbs
t+1
qmbst
(50)
Again, mortgage brokers face the same survival probability σ and maximize the discounted
stream of dividends paid to households at the stochastic discount factor Λt,t+i. The problem
writes:
V ht = maxEt
∞∑
i=1
(1− σ)σi−1Λt,t+i(nht+i) (51)
Equation (49), shows that brokers can make infinite profits from the securitization of mort-
gages. We limit this opportunity by allowing mortgage brokers to divert a fraction θh of
their assets. We claim and verify that the value function is linear in the marginal values
of its arguments (µhht, νhmt) in which µhht = νhht/Qt − νhmt/qmbst is the excess value of pool of
mortgages over MBS. Overall, the securitization of mortgages is effective if the following
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constraint holds:
V ht = µ
h
htq
h
t h
h
t +
νhmt
qmbst
nht ≥ θhqht hht (52)
The incentive constraint always binds in equilibrium. The optimization problem produces
the following first order conditions for hht and λht :
µhht =
λht
1 + λht
θh (53)
(µhht − θh)qht hht +
νhmt
qmbst
nht = 0 (54)
We rearrange Equation (54) and find the demand for the pool of mortgages:
qht h
h
t = φ
h
t n
h
t (55)
where,
φht =
νhmt/q
mbs
t
θh − µhht
(56)
as well as,
φht =
Et Λt,t+1 Ωht+1Rmt+1
θh − Et Λt,t+1 Ωht+1 (Rst+1 −Rmt+1)
(57)
in which φht is the endogenous leverage ratio of pool of mortgages over net worth. After
rearrangements, the Bellman Equation (51) yields to the following optimal conditions for
each marginal value:
µhht = Et Λt,t+1 Ωht+1 (Rst+1 −Rmt+1) (58)
νhmt
qmbst
= Et Λt,t+1 Ωht+1Rmt+1 (59)
where,
Ωht = (1− σ) + σ
∂V ht
∂nht
(60)
and,
∂V ht
∂nht
= µhhtφ
h
t +
νhmt
qmbst
(61)
The problem is isomorphic to all GSEs. Hence, summing across portfolio restrictions and
individual demands on each GSE gives:
qhtH
h
t = φ
h
t N
h
t (62)
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After rearrangements we find the issuance identity of MBS:
qmbst M
mbs,h
t =
(
φht − 1
φht
)
qhtH
h
t (63)
4.4 Households
There is a unit mass of identical households that switch occupations. They are either workers,
bankers, loan brokers or mortgage brokers, and the switching probability is σ. A represen-
tative worker buys consumption goods, chooses a housing stock and adjusts its supply of
hours worked to maximize lifetime welfare:
Ut = maxEt
∞∑
i=0
βi
[
ln(Ct+i − hCt+i−1)− χ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i + j
h h
1−ζ
t+i
1− ζ
]
(64)
where Ct is the consumption of goods, subject to habit formation of intensity h, Lt is the
number of hours worked and ht is the housing stock. Let β ∈ [0, 1] be households discount
factor, and χ, ϕ, ζ > 0 be preference parameters. Welfare maximization is achieved subject
to the following intertemporal budget constraint:
Ct +Dt + q
h
t (ht − ht−1) + RhtHt−1 +Qt
(
Sht +
1
2
κ
(
Sht − S¯h
)2)
+ qbt
(
Bht +
1
2
κ
(
Bht − B¯h
)2)
= WtLt + Π
h
t + Tt +RtDt−1 +RstS
h
t−1 +RbtB
h
t−1 +Ht (65)
where Wt stands for the real wage, Tt denotes lump-sum taxes and Πht defines the payouts
from final goods producers and the financial sector. Let Dt be the amount of deposits to
commercial banks that pay a riskless real interest rate Rt. We allow households to hold
primary securities and long-term government bonds subject to quadratic adjustment costs
1
2
κ
(
Sht − S¯h
)2
/Sht and
1
2
κ
(
Bht − B¯h
)2
/Bht . Holding these assets respectively pays Rst and
Rbt. In addition, workers accumulate housing with mortgage loans Ht granted by commercial
banks. Their borrowing capacity is constrained by the expected value of their housing stock
adjusted by the loan-to-value ratio µ. The borrowing constraint is given by:
Rht+1Ht ≤ µEtqht+1ht (66)
and states that the total value of mortgage payments must not exceed a fraction µ of the
total value of the housing stock. Let %t be the marginal utility of consumption and Λt the
stochastic (utility-adjusted) discount factor. Overall, household’s first order conditions for
16
Lt,Ct,ht and Dt are:
χLϕt = Wt%t (67)
%t = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−1 (68)
qht =
jhh−ζt
%t
+ EtΛt,t+1qht+1 + (1− EtΛt,t+1Rht+1)
Ht
ht
(69)
EtΛt,t+1Rt+1 = 1 (70)
where,
Et Λt,t+1 = β
%t+1
%t
(71)
Finally, the choices for financial securities and long-term government bonds Sht and Bht
are:
Sht = S¯
h +
Et Λt,t+1 (Rst+1 −Rt+1)
κ
(72)
Bht = B¯
h +
Et Λt,t+1 (Rbt+1 −Rt+1)
κ
(73)
4.5 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producers use labor Lt and effective capital Kt to produce the interme-
diate good Yt. The output is sold to monopolistically competitive retailers at the relative
price Pmt. The production function is:
Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t (74)
where At is the total factor productivity. The first-order conditions with respect to labor
and capital write:
Wt = (1− α) Pmt
Yt
Lt
(75)
Zt = αPmt
Yt
Kt
(76)
At the end of the period, intermediate goods producers carry a capital stock (1 − δ)Kt.
They must buy It new units of capital from capital producers. Accordingly, the law motion
of capital is:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (77)
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For each new unit of capital, goods producers issue a state-contingent security. The value
of a securitiy is the market price Qt. Because of competition, intermediate goods producers
earn zero profits. The terminal payoff is equal to the sum of gross profits and the market
value of the ex-ante capital stock (Zt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1). Thus, the real rate of return to the
commercial bank security is:
Rst+1 =
Zt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
(78)
Accordingly, the real return on ABS is:
Rat+1 =
Zt+1 + (1− δ)qabst+1
qabst
(79)
4.6 Capital goods producers
Capital goods producers build new capital and sell it to intermediate goods producers at the
market price Qt, as stated previously. They acquire the depreciated capital and final output
from retailers as inputs. Moreover, they are subject to increasing convex adjustment costs.
Capital goods producers choose It and maximize:
maxEt
∞∑
τ=t
Λt,τ
{
QiτIτ −
[
1 + f
(
Iτ
Iτ−1
)]
Iτ
}
(80)
Optimization yields to the price of capital goods:
Qt = 1 + f
(
It
It−1
)
+
(
It
It−1
)
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
− EtΛt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
f ′
(
It+1
It
)
(81)
4.7 Retail firms
Retailers provide a final output to the economy. The latter is given from a repackaging of
intermediate goods. The process evolves with:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
ε−1
ε
ft df
] ε
ε−1
(82)
where Yft is the final output for each retailer f , and where ε is the elasticity of substitution
between retail goods. We introduce nominal rigidities with price contracts à la Calvo (1983).
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Accordingly, a firm can adjust its price with probability 1 − γp. Thus, each firm chooses
an optimal reset price P ∗t subject to the above-mentioned restrictions. The optimal pricing
contract maximizes: ∞∑
i=0
γp,iΛt,t+i
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
− µpPmt+i
]
Yft+1 = 0 (83)
The law of large numbers gives the standard relation of price level dynamic:
Pt =
[
(1− γp) (P ∗t )1−ε + γp (Pt−1)1−ε
] 1
1−ε (84)
4.8 Government policy
We assume standard monetary policy by a central bank that follows a Taylor Rule with a
smoothing parameter ρ:
it = (1− ρ) (¯i+ κpipit + κy(logYt − logY ∗t )) + ρ it−1 (85)
where Y ∗t is the flexible price level of output. In addition, the central bank is able to purchase
a given amount of corporate securities, Sgt , mortgage loans H
g
t , ABS, A
abs,g
t , MBS, M
mbs,g
t
and long-term government bonds, Bgt . The government finances the purchases via a riskless
short-term obligation held by households Dgt . The central bank’s balance sheet is therefore
given by:
Dgt = QtS
g
t + q
h
tH
g
t + q
abs
t A
abs,g
t + q
mbs
t M
mbs,g
t + q
b
tB
g
t (86)
The central bank is not balance sheet constrained and transfers back earnings to the govern-
ment. In other words, the central bank can elastically obtain funds from households through
short-term bond issuance. Let ψit be the exogenous fractions of the respective assets the
central bank can purchase. The amounts of purchases are:
Sgt = ψst(S
c
t + S
h
t + S
a
t ) (87)
Hgt = ψht(H
c
t +H
h
t ) (88)
Agt = ψat(A
abs,c
t + A
abs,a
t ) (89)
M gt = ψmt(M
mbs,c
t +M
mbs,h
t ) (90)
Bgt = ψbt(B
c
t +B
h
t ) (91)
We fix government consumption as an exogenous process G¯ and impose lump-sum taxes to
households Tt. Let B¯ be the stock of long-term government debt fixed exogenously. The
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consolidated government budget constraint thus writes:
G¯+ (Rbt − 1) B¯ = Tt + (Rst −Rt − τs)Qt−1Sgt−1 + (Rht −Rt − τh)qht−1Hgt−1
+ (Rat −Rt − τa)qabst−1Aabs,gt−1 + (Rmt −Rt − τm)qmbst−1M gt−1
+ (Rbt −Rt − τb)qbt−1Bgt−1 (92)
where QE policies are subject to efficiency costs τi = 0.001 per unit of asset i purchased.
4.9 Market clearing and resource constraint
The aggregate resource constraint is:
Yt = Ct +
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
It +G+ Φt (93)
where Φt = τsQtSgt + τhqhtH
g
t + τaq
abs
t A
g
t + τmq
mbs
t M
g
t + τbq
b
tB
g
t .
Equilibrium conditions on the markets for firm loans, ABS, mortgage loans, MBS, and long-
term government bonds are:
Kt+1 = S
c
t + S
a
t + S
h
t + S
g
t (94)
Aabs,at = A
abs,c
t + A
g
t (95)
Ht = H
c
t +H
h
t +H
g
t (96)
Mmbs,ht = M
mbs,c
t +M
g
t (97)
Bt = B
c
t +B
h
t +B
g
t (98)
Assuming a fixed and unit housing stock, the equilibrium on the housing market is:
ht = 1 (99)
Finally, the equilibrium on the labor market is given by:
Wt%t = χL
ϕ
t (100)
The last market for short-term debt is cleared according to the Walras’ law.
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4.10 Yields to maturity
The major goal of QE policies is to curb long-term interest rates. As in GKb, we build a
simple term-structure to model yields to maturity of ten-year equivalent securities and bonds.
Accordingly, the behavior of a ten-year corporate security rate is given by the sequence of
nominal dividends net of depreciation for the first forty quarters. A principal payment equal
to the steady state market price level of a security Q¯ occurs the next quarter. Identically,
the yield to maturity of a ten-year ABS has an equivalent payoff structure. Both nominal
yields to maturity are given by:
PtQt = Et
40∑
s=1
(Zt+s − δ)Pt+s
(1 + ist)
s +
Pt+40Q¯
(1 + ist)
40 (101)
Ptq
abs
t = Et
40∑
s=1
(Zt+s − δ)Pt+s
(1 + iat)
s +
Pt+40 ¯qabs
(1 + iat)
40 (102)
Further, we introduce a ten-year MBS rate that delivers a coupon payment Ξm for the first
forty quarters. At the date of maturity, the principal payment is the nominal steady-state
price of the MBS ¯qmbs, so that its ten-year nominal yield to maturity is:
Ptq
mbs
t = Et
40∑
s=1
ΞmPt+s
(1 + imt)
s +
Pt+40 ¯qmbs
(1 + imt)
40 (103)
We also consider a ten-year long-term government debt that pays a dollar for the first forty
quarters. At the date of maturity, the bond repays its face value q¯b. Accordingly, the nominal
yield to maturity of a ten-year government bond is:
Ptq
b
t = Et
40∑
s=1
1
(1 + ibt)
s +
q¯b
(1 + ibt)
40 (104)
5 Experiments
5.1 Model calibration
We calibrate the model to the US economy. Time unit is the quarter. Our calibration is
reported in Table 2 and follows GKb for many parameters.
In particular, as in GKb, the subjective discount factor is β = 0.995, the capital depreciation
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rate is δ = 0.025, the capital share in the production function is α = 0.33, and the elasticity
of substitution among goods is ε = 4.167. Further, the inverse of the Frisch labor supply
elasticity is ϕ = 0.276, the relative utility weight on labor is χ = 3.41 and the inverse elasticity
of investment is ηi = 1.728. We set the degree of habit in consumption to h = 0.815. The
price rigidity parameter is set to γp = 0.779.
On the monetary side, the Taylor rule parameters are κpi = 1.5, and ρ = 0.8. As in GKb,
we use the markup variable as a proxy of the deviations of the output gap, associated to a
coefficient κX = −0.125 in the Taylor rule.
We also follow GKb to calibrate the parameters related to commercial banks. The steady
state spread between corporate securities return and the riskless rate (R¯s − R¯) is fixed at
100 basis points and the spread between long-term government bonds return and the riskless
rate (R¯b − R¯) is set at 50 basis points. Households hold three-quarters of the quantity of
long-term government debt B¯h and half of the total of corporate securities, S¯h. We adjust
the values of ∆, θc and ξc to hit the previous targets. The assets to equity ratio in commercial
banks is fixed at φc = 6.
We rely on Meeks et al. (2014) to calibrate the parameters that pertain to SPEs.4 Accord-
ingly, the excess return on ABS, (R¯a − R¯) is 25 basis points. The assets to equity ratio is
φa = 7. The relative divertibility of ABS is Θ = 0.25 and we fix the share of securitized
loans
¯Aabs,c
S¯c
to 30% of the total of corporate securities held by commercial banks. We then
adjust the values of θa and ξa to hit the previous targets.
We use the estimates of Iacoviello & Neri (2008) to calibrate the loan-to-value ratio µ and
the weight on the housing stock in the utility function jh. We set the curvature parameter
on housing to ζ = 3. Based on FRED data from 1985 to 2007, H¯
Y¯
is calibrated to match
the mean ratio of home mortgages to real GDP. Using series on Agency and GSE backed
mortgage pools and home mortgages, we fix the share of MBS. We find a quarterly mean
ratio of H¯h
H¯
= 0.43 over the period. The relative ratio of mortgage brokers assets to equity is
trickier to calibrate. We consider a ratio φh = 16, which represents the mean fraction of debt
securities to equity in GSEs in the sample. We use the primary mortgage market survey of
the average spread between the 30-year fixed mortgage rate and the 10-year treasury rate
provided by Freddie Mac to calibrate the excess return of mortgages (Rh − R). This latter
is set to 170 basis points. With this survey again, we fix our MBS spread using time series
4Meeks et al. (2014) design a “shadow banking” system in which shadow banks securitize corporate
securities. Securitization vehicles are often cited to be principal actors of the shadow banking system. Thus,
we assume that their mean calibration is consistent with our the calibration of our SPE sector.
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of 5/1-year adjustable rate mortgage and 10-year Treasury rate between 2005 and 2007.
Thus, the MBS excess return (Rm − R) is fixed to have a mean value of 115 basis points.
The transfers to new mortgage brokers ξh, the divertability of assets θh and the relative
divertibility of mortgage loans and MBS Φ and Ξ are adjusted according to the previous
targets.
Finally, the occupational survival probability is set to σ = 0.9716. The ratio of the stock
of long-term government bonds to output is 0.45 and the share of government spendings in
GDP is G¯
Y¯
= 0.2. The households’ portfolios transaction cost is κ = 1.
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Table 2: Parameters values
Capital share in the production function, α 0.33
Discount rate factor, β 0.995
Capital depreciation rate, δ 0.025
Habit parameter, h 0.815
Relative weight on labor, χ 3.482
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϕ 0.276
Inverse elasticity of investment, ηi 1.728
Elasticity of substitution between goods, ε 4.167
Price rigidity parameter, γp 0.779
Taylor Rule inflation coefficient, κpi 1.5
Taylor Rule markup coefficient, κX -0.125
Taylor Rule smoothing parameter, ρ 0.8
Survival probability, σ 0.9716
Divertibility of bankers assets, θc 0.3451
Divertibility of loan brokers assets, θa 0.2719
Divertibility of mortgage brokers assets, θh 0.4146
Relative divertibility of government bonds, ∆ 0.5
Relative divertibility of ABS, Θ 0.25
Relative divertibility of mortgage loans, Φ 1.7
Relative divertibility of MBS, Ξ 1.15
Transfers to new bankers, ξc 0.001
Transfers to new loans brokers, ξa 0.001
Transfers to new mortgages brokers, ξh 0.001
Fraction of corporate securities in HH portfolios, S¯h
K¯
0.5
Fraction of government bonds in HH portfolios, B¯h
B¯
0.75
Treasury supply ratio, B¯
Y¯
0.45
Government expenditures ratio, G¯
Y¯
0.2
Portfolios adjustment costs, κ 1
Loan-to-value ratio, µ 0.85
Relative weight on housing, jh 0.12
Elasticity of housing stock in the utility function, ζ 3
Ratio of ABS to the total of corporate securities,
¯Aabs,c
S¯c
0.30
Ratio of mortgage debts to GDP, H¯
Y¯
0.35
Ratio of MBS to the total mortgage loans, H¯h
H¯
0.43
5.2 Empirical versus theoretical IRFs
We can now conduct various experiments. First, we confront the IRFs generated by the
BVAR to those generated by the above DSGE. Second, we analyze the key differences in
terms of IRFs between our model and the benchmark model of GKb. We argue that the
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differences characterize the portfolio rebalancing channel of QE policies while the common
features portray the standard credit channel.
We now analyze the effects of a QE shock in our theoretical model and compare those to the
empirical IRFs obtained in our BVAR analysis. We report the DSGE-generated IRFs for the
log deviation of output Y , the inflation rate pi, the corporate spread (is10− ii10), and the QE
shock (ii10 − i). In the theoretical model, the QE shock is given by a long-term government
bonds purchase program where the fraction of assets purchased is adjusted to match precisely
the fall in the government spread that we have identified in the data. Accordingly, Figure
2 presents the IRFs of the experiment. Firstly, responses are fairly identical in terms of
shapes and magnitude, except for real GDP, that does not show a negative deviation in the
theoretical model. However, real GDP and inflation rate display hump-shaped and sizable
positive responses in both models. This confirms the benefits of QE policies in terms of
economic activity. We claim that the securization mechanisms introduced in the DSGE
model are the source of the replicated portfolio rebalancing channel. As presented below,
the dynamics of quantities and relative prices of different assets stress the role of imperfect
arbitrage in the choices of investors among assets that are close substitutes. Accordingly,
imperfect arbitrage explains the observed negative response of the theoretical and empirical
corporate spreads (BAA-10Y, is10−ii10), but it is also at the heart of the portfolio rebalancing
channel, illustrated by the empirical response of the BAA-AAA spread.
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Figure 2: DSGE versus BVAR
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Black: DSGE model, Blue: BVAR model.
5.3 Quantitative Easing policy
We now compare the theoretical IRFs after a QE shock on corporate securities in our DSGE
and in the baseline model of GKb. Both shocks are calibrated so that the total of purchases
represent 1% of real output. We model a strong market segmentation, i.e. the absence of
equity capital transfers among financial intermediaries to capture the kind of disruption of the
financial intermediation the US experienced in 2008. Figures 3 and 4 present the simulations.
Panel 1 shows that all asset spreads are significantly (mostly negatively) reacting to the
purchase of firm securities (given by Equation (87)). The dynamics of relative asset prices,
shown by the dynamics of spreads, generate large asset rebalancings that are the major
effects of the program seen in Panel 2. From theses responses, we claim that we capture
both the credit easing channel and the portfolio rebalancing channel of the purchase.
The credit easing channel works as in GKb. First, the central bank intermediation increases
the demand for bonds and assets. With limits to arbitrage, households assets and bonds
demands are quite inelastic in the short-run. In addition, the absence of financial frictions
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intermediation process of the central bank shifts the preferences of households to hold short-
term government debts instead of costly deposits in commercial banks. In other words,
households arbitrage away the deadweight cost associated with the moral hazard problem
that bankers face. Moreover, the presence of this balance sheet constraint further amplifies
the effects of the purchase. Indeed, the issuance of firm loans must be exactly balanced by
the multiple leverage ratios of equity capital stocks. All else being equal, the purchase of
corporate securities will be then greater than banks holdings capacities. Given this short-
run relative inelasticity of total supply of bonds and assets, the QE shock directly pushes
downward financial spreads. On one side, profits of commercial banks are partly protected
by a net worth effect due to rises in asset prices. On the other side, they must offset asset
market imbalances due to their restrictions to meet certain leverage ratios. As a result,
they put pressure on financial spreads, which slightly impairs their balance sheets. Thus,
they should engage in a reallocation of asset holdings. As in GKb, Equation (32) shows
that frictions on long-term bonds are weaker than limits to arbitrage on corporate securities
held by bankers. Thus, the yield of the former is a positive proportion ∆ of the latter.
That is why in GKb we observe a reallocation of bankers portfolios from corporate securities
towards long-term government bonds holdings (which is not the case in our framewok). This
sum of effects capture a financial accelerator mechanism on which the credit channel of QE
transmission is based. Overall, the joint effects of limited expansion in bankers balance
sheets and inelastic demand for assets and bonds leads to a disintermediation process. As
a consequence, in terms of the funding of capital accumulation, firms rely more heavily on
public intermediation and less on private intermediation.
Up to this point, we have neglected the housing market and the securitization mechanisms,
and focused on the core dynamic of GKb. Let us now focus on the portfolio rebalancing
channel and highlight the double-dip effects of QE policies. The latter can be described
as follows. From the above analysis we know that deposits to commercial banks fall in
response to a purchase of corporate securities, which triggers a reallocation among banks
assets and bonds. With housing and securitization mechanisms, the adjustment process is
more complex. As a matter of fact, we observe a rise in the holdings of mortgage loans Hc in
bankers portfolios. This is due to the presence of frictions in the housing market: limits to
arbitrage seen in Equation (66) suggest that an increase in the market value of the mortgage
asset qh gives the opportunity to benefit from higher earnings through the detention of further
mortgage loans. Accordingly, the net demand for mortgage loans increases with the fall in
the spread (E(Rh) − E(Rs)), within the bounds of the fixed housing stock. Interestingly,
equations (27) and (28) show that bankers do not rebalance portfolios away from firm loans
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to mortgage loans Hc but rather lower their holdings of ABS, Aabs,c , MBS, Mmbs,c, and
long-term government bonds, Bc. Overall, market imbalances, the shortage of deposits and
constraints on leverage ratios, all lead bankers to reduce their ability to pool firm loans Sa
and mortgage loans Hh. In addition, equations (47) and (63) show that ABS and MBS
are positively correlated respectively to the holdings of pool of corporate securities and
pool of mortgages. Thus, the binding constraints of SPEs and GSEs trigger a reduction
of securitization activities that results in a fall of the supply of ABS (Aabs,a) and of MBS
(Mmbs,h). Again, equity capital stocks of these intermediaries Na and Nh are somehow
sustained by net worth effects due to the observed increase in asset prices.
Concerning yields to maturity, Figure 3 (Panel 1) reports the relationship between financial
spreads and the drop in long-term yields. As in GKb, we provide a ten-year “risk-free” swap
rate ii10 based on the rate of a bond that would pay the nominal interest rate each quarter
for ten years. In the credit channel of QE transmission, is10 is the key variable of interest
as it drives the dynamics of investment expenditures. Equations (31) and (32) indicate that
Ra and Rb deviate in the short-run by Θ and ∆ times less than Rs, respectively in response
to a QE shock. However, we observe that the magnitude of the respective declines in is10
and ib10 are different and greater than the portion ∆ in the long-run (a fact that can also
be seen through the dynamics of spreads, is10 − ii10, ib10 − ii10 and is10 − ib10. Following a
similar pattern, the short-term proportion Θ betwen ia10 and is10 (seen in Equation (31))
slightly increases over time. This assessment is also noticeable in the drops of is10 − ii10,
ia10 − ii10 and is10 − ia10. Moreover, the weight Ξ between Rm and Rs shown in Equation
(30) is also increasing after a QE shock on corporate securities. Actually, im10 drops by
more than two times the decrease in is10, which is also visible in the spreads im10 − ii10,
is10 − ii10 and im10 − is10. In other words, the level of is10 is deviating from the level of im10,
which we take as evidence of a portfolio rebalancing channel. This latter alters the shape
of the respective yield curves of these different assets. This channel complements the credit
channel that makes all spreads fall similarly, i.e. that shifts the yield curve downward while
preserving its shape.
Finally, our QE shock is transmitted to the real activity with sizable differences in terms
of deviations of macroeconomic variables from their initial values. In particular, capital
accumulation and output show larger responses. This phenomenon is mostly demand-driven
and is amplified by the two channels analyzed above. Indeed, a big part of the difference
between both models is due to a greater drop in the cost of capital Rs, which in turn, leads
entrepreneurs to raise investment in physical capital. As a result, investment expenditures
and households consumption rise, so that output is further stimulated with positive feedback
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effects on aggregate demand.
Figure 3: DSGE versus GKb, purchase of firm securities, Panel 1
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Black: our DSGE, Blue: model of GKb.
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Figure 4: DSGE versus GKb, purchase of firm securities, Panel 2
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Black: our DSGE, Blue: model of GKb.
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6 Conclusion
This paper provides a dual approch using empirical and theoretical models to capture the
portfolio rebalancing channel of QE. The BVAR model is able to show that an identified
purchase of long-term government bonds not only affects its yields but also those of close
substitutes (here high-quality corporate bonds). We then built a calibrated DSGE model
with financial frictions to disentangle the core mechanism behind the portfolio rebalancing
channel of QE. Fed with an exogenous QE shock on long-term government bond, we compare
the IRFs of the theoretical model to those obtained with the BVAR model. We find a satisfy-
ing match among the results which allows us to claim that the securitization mechanisms in
the DSGE model are the linchpin of a replicated portfolio rebalancing channel. In addition,
we report and compare the IRFs of GKb to our responses. We argue that any difference
between both models is due to the portfolio rebalancing channel. Overall, the presence of se-
curitization mechanisms and strong market segmentation enhance the effects of a QE shock
to the economy and alter the shapes of our designed yield curves of different assets and
bonds. Nevertheless, we believe this framework is far too simple to entirely explain recent
events providing motivations for further research, which should incorporate modifications of
the DSGE model to loosen the market segmentation and explore the impacts of different
exit strategies on the whole dynamic.
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